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ABSTRACT
In this work, we address the problem of designing delay-
based anonymous communication systems. We consider a
timed mix where an eavesdropper wants to learn the com-
munication pattern of the users, and study how the mix must
delay the messages so as to increase the adversary’s estima-
tion error. We show the connection between this problem and
a MIMO system where we want to design the coloring filter
that worsens the adversary’s estimation of the MIMO chan-
nel matrix. We obtain theoretical solutions for the optimal
filter against short-term and long-term adversaries, evaluate
them with experiments, and show how some properties of fil-
ters can be used in the implementation of timed mixes. This
opens the door to the application of previously known filter
design techniques to anonymous communication systems.
Index Terms— Anonymity, filter design, timed mixes,
optimization
1. INTRODUCTION
Anonymity in communication systems is typically achieved at
the expense of delay or communication bandwidth. Mixes [1,
2], the basic building blocks of high-latency anonymous
communication systems, are channels that delay messages,
change their appearance and output them in a random order
in batches. This confuses an eavesdropper trying to unveil
the path followed by the messages in the network, who is not
able to identify the sender of a message leaving the mix with
absolute certainty.
It is well known that two delaying mechanisms that cause
the same average delay in the communication can achieve dif-
ferent protection against a malicious observer. Since delay is
the main resource to generate privacy in delay-based anony-
mous communication systems, it is of paramount importance
to understand how to use it optimally.
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The design of the delya characteristic of an anonymous
communication system has been studied in the literature with
different privacy goals in mind [3, 4, 5]. In this work, we take
over the work in [5], where the authors obtain the optimal de-
lay characteristic against an eavesdropper with global vision
of the network that tries to learn the average number of mes-
sages each sender sends to each receiver. We start from the
results in that paper and interpret the problem as a filter design
problem in a MIMO system, where the delay characteristic is
a filter, which allows us to reason about some results obtained
in [5]. We also make a clear distinction between two scenarios
that give different optimal delay characteristics, and find the
optimal characteristic in an scenario where senders send most
of their messages to only one of their friends, which is not
covered by previous work. Finally, we show how filter prop-
erties can help in the implementation of delay functions in a
decentralized way, which is of particular interest in practice.
The rest of the document is distributed as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the system model and notation, as well as pre-
vious results that are relevant for this work. It also sets up
the optimization problem of designing the delay characteris-
tic that maximizes the privacy of the users. We solve this
problem in Sect. 3 for different scenarios, one of which was
not considered in previous works, and validate our results. Fi-
nally, in Sect. 4 we give examples of how some properties of
filter design can be used in the implementation of delay-based
anonymous communications, and conclude in Sect. 5.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. System Model and Notation
We consider a system where a group of N senders, indexed
by i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, send messages to a group ofM receivers,
indexed by j ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, through an anonymous com-
munication channel, which we model as a timed mix. The
timed mix contains a timer that loops continuously, counting
down starting at τ seconds, thus creating laps that are called
rounds. When a message arrives at the mix, it is assigned a
random delay drawn from a probability mass function called
delay characteristic. When the timer expires, all the messages
whose delay is zero have their appearance changed through
cryptographic tools and are forwarded to their corresponding
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Fig. 1. System model. The adversary observes X and Y,
knows d and τ , and wants to learn the probabilities in P.
recipients. The messages that remain in the mix have their
delay decreased in one unit, and will leave eventually as the
timer loops.
We consider an adversary observing the messages arriv-
ing and leaving the mix for T seconds, i.e., during a total of
ρ = bT/τc rounds. The adversary can observe all the mes-
sages sent by every sender and received by every recipient
(i.e., it is global), and it is a mere observer of the system (i.e.,
it is passive). One example of such adversary is a malicious
Internet Service Provider. The goal of this adversary is to
learn the probability that a message sent by i is received by j,
denoted by pj,i. This represents the percentage of messages
from i that go to j on average. We assume that the adversary
knows how the mix works (i.e., τ and the delay character-
istic) but cannot look inside it. The change of appearance
of the messages inside the mix prevents the adversary from
performing bit-wise linkability of input and output messages,
while the random delay and grouping of messages in rounds
prevents timing linkability. This system is depicted in Fig. 1.
We now introduce the statistical model and the notation,
which is summarized in Table 1. The random variable that
models the number of messages sent by user i in round r
is denoted by Xri . Each input message is delayed indepen-
dently and randomly according to the delay characteristic d .=
[d0, d1, · · · , dρ−1]T , where dk is the probability that the mix
delays a message k rounds. The recipient of each message
sent by user i is j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} with probability pj,i. Fi-
nally, the total number of messages that receiver j gets in
round r is Y rj . Using these variables, we also build the ρ×N
matrix of all input observations X, whose i, r-th element is
Xri , i.e., (X)r,i = X
r
i . Likewise, we build Y and P as
(Y)r,j = Y
r
j and (P)i,j = pj,i.
2.2. Previous Results and Connection with MIMO Com-
munications
Previous works have studied different problems in this same
model. Here, we summarize some results, mainly from [5, 6],
that are of particular interest for our work. The first result is
that E{Y|X} = D · X · P, where D is a convolution ma-
trix defined as (D)r,s = dr−s if r − s ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise.
Table 1. Summary of notation
pj,i Prob. user i sends a message to j. (P)i,j = pj,i.
dk Prob. a msg. is delayed k rounds. (d)k = dk.
Xri No. msgs. sent by i in round r. (X)r,i = X
r
i .
Y rj No. msgs. received by j in round r. (Y)r,j= Y
r
j .
νi “Sharpness” of i, νi =
∑
j p
2
j,i. (ν)k = νi.
This means that, on average, the M output processes in the
columns of Y are a linear combination (produced by P) of the
N input processes that are the columns of X, convolved with
the delay characteristic d. If we define the noise of the outputs
N
.
= Y −DXP, another result is that the covariance matrix
of this noise is ΣN|X = diag {DX1N}−D·diag {Xν}·DT .
In this expression, 1N is an N × 1 all-ones vector, and ν is
a vector whose i-th entry is νi
.
=
∑M
j=1 p
2
j,i. This parame-
ter represents the “sharpness” of the sending behavior of user
i. Values νi ≈ 1 represent a sender that focuses in a sin-
gle receiver, while νi ≈ 0 represents a sender that distributes
messages evenly among her recipients.
From these results, we can see the d box in Fig. 1 as a
linear filter and P as a MIMO channel matrix for the aver-
ages, and consider that Y is obtained after adding the noise
N to this average. The problem of designing the delay char-
acteristic d against an adversary that wants to estimate the
sending behavior P is then equivalent to the problem of de-
signing a filter d against an adversary that wants to estimate
the MIMO channel matrix P. We will use this interpretation
of d as a filter below. Note that even though X and Y only
contain integer numbers (because messages cannot be broken
in smaller units), with this interpretation we can disregard the
integer constraints because X and Y are observations, not pa-
rameters to estimate.
2.3. Privacy Metric and Analysis
As mentioned above, the adversary wants to learn the proba-
bilities P, that are sensitive information from the users, after
observing X and Y and knowing τ and d. Previous works
delve into the study of the best linear estimator for Pˆ in this
scenario and the privacy metric used to assess the success of
this adversary. We refer to [5, 6] for a thorough derivation of
these results, and just note that the overall mean squared er-
ror ξT of the adversary can be written as ξT = Tr {MCeM},
where M .= diag {[µ(1), · · · , µ(N)]} is a normalizing diago-
nal matrix and Ce is the covariance matrix of the adversary’s
error Ce
.
= E{EET }, where E .= Pˆ−P. This matrix can be
written for the best linear estimator of P as
Ce = E{(XTDTDX)−1XTDTΣN|XDX(XTDTDX)−1} .
(1)
Using the expression for ΣN|X above, we have a relation be-
tween the overall privacy ξT and the delay characteristic d.
3. DESIGN OF THE OPTIMAL DELAY
CHARACTERISTIC
Now we study how to design the delay characteristic d such
as to increase the adversary’s overall error ξT . In this section,
we use λk to denote the k-th DFT coefficient of the ρ-point
DFT of d. We start by discussing some constraints on d and
set up the design problem that gives us the optimal filter dopt.
Then, we study the solution to this problem in two cases: 1)
when the adversary observes the system indefinitely (ρ→∞)
and ρ  N , and 2) when the adversary observes the system
a number of rounds ρ commensurate to N . This distinction,
which is not clear in previous works, is important because it
leads to different solutions. We call each of these scenarios
long-term and short-term adversary/attack, respectively.
3.1. Constraints on the Delay Characteristic
Although it is possible to see the delay characteristic d as a
filter, we must keep in mind that it is actually a probability
mass function, and therefore it must follow some constraints:
a) Non-negativity: since the values of this filter are prob-
abilities, it must hold that dk ≥ 0 for all k. The consequences
of non-negativity constraints in filter design have been dis-
cussed in [7, 8, 9]. An immediate consequence is that λ0 ≥
λk for all k. A more complex effect of these constraints, ex-
plained in detail in [8], is that it is easier to achieve a filter d
with large attenuation factor in high frequencies than in mid-
dle and low frequencies.
b) Normalization: another direct consequence of the fact
that d is a probability mass function is
∑ρ−1
k=0 dk = 1. This
forces the first DFT coefficient to be one, i.e., λ0 = 1.
c) Average delay: we want to design a mix that guar-
antees that the average delay of the messages in the system,
measured in rounds, does not exceed some value δ¯, i.e.,∑ρ−1
k=0 k · dk ≤ δ¯. One of the effects of this constraint is that,
of all the filters that give the same magnitude response, we
will prefer the minimum phase solution, i.e., the one whose
zeros lie inside the unit circle. This comes from the fact
that the group delay of the filter and the average delay δ¯ are
closely related.
We denote the space of filters d that follow these con-
straints by C. This is defined formally as
C =
{
d :
ρ−1∑
k=0
dk = 1,
ρ−1∑
k=0
k · dk ≤ δ¯, dk ≥ 0 ∀k
}
. (2)
Note that the filters d ∈ C are causal (by definition) and sta-
ble. Then, the optimal delay characteristic we are looking for,
denoted by dopt, is the solution to
dopt = argmax
d∈C
Tr {MCeM} . (3)
where Ce is given in (1). We now study this solution against
long-term and short-term adversaries.
3.2. Long-Term Optimal Delay Characteristic
When ρ → ∞ and ρ  N , we can approximate the terms
XTDTDX and XTDTΣN|XDX in (1) by their expected
values and obtain a closed form expression for ξT . Let γ1
.
=∑
k d
2
k and γ2
.
=
∑
r (
∑
k drdr+k)
2. If we assume the inputs
are i.i.d. Poissonian, in the Appendix we show that when users
have several friends with whom they communicate evenly
(νi ≈ 0), then ξT grows with 1/γ1. When users send most
of their messages to only one of their friends (νi ≈ 1), then
ξT grows with (γ1 − γ2)/γ21 . Therefore, we set
dlong =

argmax
d∈C
(1/γ1) if νi ≈ 0 ,
argmax
d∈C
(γ1 − γ2)/γ21 if νi ≈ 1 .
(4)
The study of dlong when νi ≈ 0, including a close-form ex-
pression for it, already appears in [5]. However, it is important
to note that when νi ≈ 1 the solution changes, and this case
was not analyzed in [5]. Note that we can also extend this so-
lution to the case where the input samples are not independent
by including a coloring filter g before the adversary observa-
tion in the model, and replacing d by d ∗ g in the formulas
above.
Now we evaluate these results, comparing the numerical
solution dopt using (3) and the theoretical one dlong in (4). We
generate X using real data fed to a timed mix. We use the real
data in [5] so that this work is comparable to previous ones
(see [5] for a thorough description of the real datasets). We
take N = 100 users and ρ = 1 500 rounds from the datasets
in order to study a case where ρ  N , and generate P using
a Zipf distribution with 10 friends per sender for νi ≈ 0 and
a single friend for νi = 1, with M = 100. We compute
dopt and dlong for the 3 datasets in [5] and show the average
results in Fig. 2.a. We can see that the optimal filter obtained
analytically (4) is very close to the numerical one obtained
through evaluation of (3) using X.
3.3. Short-Term Optimal Delay Characteristic
We now consider the case where the number of observed
rounds ρ is commensurate with the number of senders N .
In this case, it is argued in [10] that XTDTDX should be
made as close to singular as possible. We can write this as
XHf |Λd|2Xf where Xf is the ρ × N matrix of the DFT
of the inputs and Λd is the diagonal matrix containing the
coefficients of the ρ-point DFT of d. To make this matrix
close to singular, it makes sense to try to make ρ − N DFT
coefficients of d close to zero. This is easier to achieve for
high-frequencies, as a consequence of the positivity con-
straints [8]. Therefore, we can set1
dshort = argmin
d∈C
ρ−N/2+1∑
k=N/2+1
λk . (5)
1This is for even N . A small tweak is required for oddN .
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Fig. 2. Optimal delay characteristic against a long-term (ρ =
1 500) and short-term (ρ = 500) adversary, with N = 100.
The results obtained numerically (generating X by taking
N = 100 users and ρ = 500 rounds from the real datasets)
using (4) and analytically with (5) are close, as shown in
Fig. 2.b. From a filter-design perspective, the frequency re-
sponse in dB (Fig. 2.b, right) confirms that the optimal pool
is the low-pass filter that tries to remove information from the
ρ−N = 400 high-frequency DFT coefficients.
4. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we show how some properties of filters can
be used to aid in the implementation of anonymous com-
munication systems. Normally, anonymous communication
systems are designed in a non-centralized way, with several
devices connected in a network, for scalability and trust rea-
sons [11, 12, 13, 14]. In this case, the delay characteristic of
the timed mix is the addition of the individual delays provided
by the different components of the network. The task of de-
signing a decentralized delay-based anonymous communica-
tion system can be simplified by considering basic properties
of filter design. We illustrate the application of some of these
properties (direct form implementation, cascade and parallel
filters) in the two examples below and leave the study of how
these findings can be used to configure and improve real sys-
tems like Mixmaster [12] and JAP [14] for future work.
a) Timed mix as a cascade of nodes. We want to imple-
ment a time mix in a distributed way using 5 nodes in cascade,
to protect N = 100 senders against a short-term adversary
that observes the inputs and outputs for ρ = 500 rounds. The
delay introduced by two nodes in cascade properly synchro-
nized with the timer is the convolution of the individual delay
characteristics (as in filters in cascade). Therefore, configur-
ing the delay of the nodes as shown in Fig. 3.a, we achieve
the overall delay characteristic, result of convolving the 5 in-
dividual responses, shown in Fig. 3.b (achieved). We see that
this overall delay is close to the optimal one (objective). Fig-
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Fig. 3. Use of filter properties in anonymous network design.
ure 3.c shows the frequency response, where we see that the
nodes try to reduce the ρ − N = 400 high-frequency DFT
coefficients.
b) Distributed exponential mix. We want to build an ex-
ponential mix, i.e., a timed mix with dk = α(1− α)k, which
is optimal for some privacy metrics [3, 4]. This is equivalent
to a first-order IIR filter which we can implement easily in
direct form, using a node that only delays messages until the
end of a round (d = 1) and a switch that sends messages to
an output with probability α, and to the other with probability
1−α (Fig. 3.d). In order to implement this device in a decen-
tralized way, we place several IIR filters in parallel as shown
in Fig. 3.e, where a message is forwarded to its recipient with
probability α in each round, and fed to a random node with
probability 1− α. The overall response is the same since this
is equivalent to an scenario where we have identical IIR filters
in parallel.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have studied the problem of designing the
delay characteristic of timed mixes against a global adver-
sary that aims at learning the communication patterns of the
users. We have obtained theoretical solutions for this problem
against a long-term and short-term attack, and have shown
through experiments that they are close to the ones obtained
numerically. We also showed the connection between design-
ing delay characteristics and filters, and used this connection
to implement the timed mixes in a decentralized way as a net-
work of delaying nodes.
6. APPENDIX
We provide an expression for the overall MSE ξT of the best
linear estimator of P, described in [15], under the following
conditions:
1. The number of rounds observed by the adversary goes
to infinity (ρ→∞) and it is much larger than the num-
ber of users in the system (ρ N ).
2. The input processes are i.i.d. as a Poisson distribution,
i.e., Xri ∼ P (µ(i)).
3. The average number of messages sent each round by all
the users is much larger than one, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 µ(i) 1.
The expression we obtain only depends on the delay charac-
teristic d .= [d0, d1, · · · , dρ−1]T through the following pa-
rameters:
γ1
.
=
∑
k
d2k (6)
γ2
.
=
∑
r
(∑
k
drdr+k
)2
(7)
γ3
.
=
∑
k
d3k. (8)
After obtaining an expression for ξT , we prove that the
MSE grows with 1/γ1 when the “sharpness” of each sender,
defined as νi
.
=
∑M
j=1 p
2
j,i for sender i, is almost zero, i.e.,
νi ≈ 0, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. We also prove that the overall
MSE grows with (γ1 − γ2)/γ21 when νi ≈ 1 for all i.
7. THEORETICAL EXPRESSION FOR ξT .
From [15], we get that
ξT = E{Tr
{
M(XTDTDX)−1XTDTΣN|XDX(XTDTDX)−1M
}} ,
(9)
where
ΣN|X = diag {DX1N} −D · diag {Xν} ·DT . (10)
We define
Rxx
.
=
1
ρ
XTDTDX (11)
and
Rxyx
.
=
1
ρ
XTDTΣN|XDX , (12)
and note that (9) can be written as
ξT = E{Tr
{
MR−1xxRxyxR
−1
xxM
}} . (13)
The entries of Rxx and Rxyx are sample averages over ρ, and
therefore as ρ grows they get closer to their expected value.
Using that the the input samples in X are i.i.d. Poissonian
with rates µ .= [µ(1), · · · , µ(N)]T , we can compute
Rxx = µµ
T + γ1 · diag {µ} . (14)
On the other hand, we can expand Rxyx as
Rxyx =
1
ρX
TDT diag {DX1N}DX− 1ρXTDTDdiag {Xν}DTDX .
(15)
Let R′xyx and R
′′
xyx be the first and second summands of
this expression, respectively. These summands can be writ-
ten, when ρ→∞, as
R′xyx = µµ
T
(
2γ1 +
N∑
i=1
µ(i)
)
+diag {µ}
(
γ3 + γ1 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)
)
,
(16)
and
R′′xyx = µµ
T ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)νi + γ1 ·
[
(µ ◦ ν)µT + µ(µ ◦ ν)T ]
+ γ2 · diag {µ} ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)νi + γ
2
1 · diag {µ ◦ ν} .
(17)
where ◦ is the entry-wise or Hadamard product.
In order to compute ξT , we need an expression for R−1xx .
Using the Sherman-Morrison formula in (14), we can write
R−1xx =
1
γ1
(
diag {µ}−1 − 1N1
T
N
γ1 +
∑N
i=1 µ(i)
)
. (18)
We then use our assumption
∑N
i=1 µ(i) 1 and the fact that
1 ≥ γ1 to approximate γ1 +
∑N
i=1 µ(i) ≈
∑N
i=1 µ(i) in this
expression.
Finally, we perform the matrix multiplications to obtain
MR−1xxRxyxR
−1
xxM and compute its trace to obtain a closed-
form expression for ξT :
ξT ≈ 1
ρ
· 1
γ21
·
(
γ1 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)− γ2 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)νi + γ3
)
·
[
N∑
i=1
µ(i)−
∑N
i=1 µ(i)
2∑N
i=1 µ(i)
]
+
1
ρ
·
[( ∑N
i=1 µ(i)
2
(
∑N
i=1 µ(i))
2
+ 1
)
·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)νi −
∑N
i=1 µ(i)
2νi∑N
i=1 µ(i)
]
.
(19)
We study now the dependence of ξT on the delay characteris-
tic when νi ≈ 0 and νi ≈ 1. Note that, regardless of the value
of νi, the second term in (19) does not depend on the delay
characteristic, so we can disregard it when studying how to
design the delay characteristic to increase the MSE.
8. DEPENDENCE OF ξT ON THE DELAY
CHARACTERISTIC
8.1. First scenario (νi ≈ 0).
In this case, we can write
γ1 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)− γ2 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)νi + γ3 (20)
≈ γ1 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i) + γ3 ≈ γ1 ·
N∑
i=1
µ(i) , (21)
where the first step comes from νi ≈ 0 and the second one
from γ3 ≤ γ1 and
∑N
i=1 µ(i)  1. Since the second term of
(19) can be disregarded when νi ≈ 0, we have
ξT ≈ 1
ρ
· 1
γ1
·
N∑
i=1
µ(i) ·
[
N∑
i=1
µ(i)−
∑N
i=1 µ(i)
2∑N
i=1 µ(i)
]
. (22)
Then, the overall MSE of the adversary is proportional to
1/γ1, and therefore in order to increase ξT we must increase
1/γ1.
8.2. Second scenario (νi ≈ 1).
Here, by evaluating νi ≈ 1 and using the same approxima-
tions above, we get
ξT ≈ 1
ρ
·
N∑
i=1
µ(i)·
[
γ1 − γ2
γ21
·
(
N∑
i=1
µ(i)−
∑N
i=1 µ(i)
2∑N
i=1 µ(i)
)
+ 1
]
.
(23)
We can see that, in order to increase ξT , we must increase
(γ1 − γ2)/γ21 .
This concludes the proof.
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